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Abstract
In this paper, we perform a case study on a community bank from the aspect of the terms structure of the banks historical loan
losses and the loan quality rating matrix used by the bank. The data source is from a small rural community bank located in a
Midwestern state of the United States. The basic statistical analysis of the loan losses that is based on the banks internal loan quality
rating system is presented.
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1. Introduction
The continued improvement of the credit analysis process of a bank is indispensable in the current financial
environment for any bank, especially a community bank. Advances in information technology, the development of
new financial instruments, and other innovations in banking, along with increased regulation and competition from
non-regulated financial entities have made a much less friendly environment for community banks today than in the
past.
During the most recent financial crisis, a large number of commercial banks in the United States were closed. The
regulators closed 507 banks from 2008 to 2012, while only 25 banks were closed in the period 2001 through 2007.
Commercial banks having less than one billion dollars in assets made up 85% of the number of banks closed between
2008 and 2014 and made up 92% of the number of banks closed from 2001 through 2007. The median level of
leverage capital for the community banking industry as of June 2010 was 9.45%. This was roughly equal to the median* Corresponding author. Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu, Sichuan Province, 610031, PR China.
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failed with 123 (75%) having assets less than $1 billion.d
Given these facts regarding the number of smaller bank failures as a percentage of the total number of bank failures,
improvement in both the methodology of developing an adequate loan loss reserve and the credit risk management of
these banks is necessary for the survival of smaller banks in the future.
This paper examines how a community bank might use a loan quality rating system which contains both objective
factors and judgmental adjustments to first stratify the loans held by the bank into risk categories and then use these
risk categories to develop a robust methodology to calculate a loan loss reserve for the bank. In addition, this data can
be used to develop stress test models regarding loan losses for the bank. Stress testing for community banks was called
for in a paper presented to the Conference of State Bank Supervisors in 2010. The term structure of the loan loss
analysis for the loan quality ratings in our study are the basic mean and variance for each rating is given through the
years 2007e2014 as the bank had data for that period.
This paper will focus only on what a community bank could do to use data already available to improve its credit
risk management process. In order to focus on a community bank, it is important to understand what we define as a
community bank. A community bank can be referred to as a bank having, typically, less than or equal to one billion
dollars in total assets. On the other hand, this single proxy used to define a community bank does not take into account
other factors which may also define a community bank. We would like to adapt a more complete definition of a
community bank has given by DeYoung et al (2004)4 as:
A community bank holds a commercial bank or thrift charter; operates physical offices within a limited geographic
area; offers a variety of loans and checkable insured deposit accounts; and has a local focus that precludes its equity
shares from trading in well-developed capital markets.
FDIC (2012)6 refers to the problem of defining community banks by size due to some factors such as inflation,
economic growth and the size of the banking industry varying over time. We perform this case study for a community
bank with total assets less than $1 billion.
The financial crisis of 2007e2009 lead to the widespread failure of financial institutions and/or the freezing of
capital markets. The financial regulations and insolvency procedures for large complex financial institutions,
including those non-banking institutions that would pose a large systemic risk to the financial system, have been
revisited in order to improve their ability to absorb losses and avoid a potential public bailout of these institutions.13
recommends that the capital requirement should depend on the liquidity of the assets held by a bank and should
increase with the proportion of its short-term debt and with its size. The DoddeFrank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act focused primarily on the largest financial institutions in the United States.e
This paper takes the spirit of the Dodd-Frank Act to improve the credit risk aspect of the community bank. The data
used in this study (loan quality rating system, term structure of the loan loss distribution, and the default rates on loans)
was developed by the bank to meet the Interagency Policy Statement on the Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses
dated December 21, 1993. The authors of this study empirically examine the loan quality ratings and loss distributions
as well as the recovery rate (loss rate) for loans made by the community bank. The purpose code loans may have
different loan losses varying from one code to another. These are related to the coordinate rating proposed by the first
author Li (2014).9 The coordinate rating is given by the loan grade, collateral code and purpose code as the first,
second and third coordinate rating component in this case study. Individual loan may be classified from the purpose
code and from the collateral code as well as the loan grading, and those different perspectives formulate the coordinate
rating.
It is important to note that the loan quality rating system being studied in this paper is not the same as the credit
scoring systems used by many large complex banks for small business lending on loans which, depending upon thed Data based on the Bank Failures in Brief for FDIC-insured U.S community banks from the FDIC website. The worst year was 1992 when there
were 179 banks failure in that year.
e President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (The Dodd-Frank Act in short) into law on
July 21, 2010. The Dodd-Frank Act makes considerable progress on the off-balance sheet activities in computing capital requirements among
other issues. In July 2010, Basel III is also stricter on what constitutes capital, sets a minimum leverage ratio and higher capital requirement, and
creates liquidity ratios that banks will eventually have to abide by (see Dodd-Frank Act (2014) for more current Supervisory stress test meth-
odologies and results)Even in Basel Committee (2002), banks are required to estimate the probability of default (PD) and the loss given default
(LGD) on their loan portfolios of the business cycle. The data of the community bank is not enough for us to estimate these important credit risk
factors.
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business lending tool.1 Berger and Frame (2007) concentrated on small business credit scoring, a lending technology
used by many financial institutions to evaluate applicants for loans under $250,000. The small business credit scoring
model is a statistical approach to predicting the probability that the credit applicant will default or will become de-
linquent on those loans.
The loan quality rating system examined in this paper is not an automated credit scoring system. The loan quality
rating system examined in this paper is done by assigning objective ratings to both the credit or borrowing the funds
and the collateral securing the debt with the lending officers having input using judgmental adjustments to the final
composite loan quality grade based on their experience as lenders.
The remainder this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the loan quality rating system used by the
bank, detailed rating definitions are given in Appendix. The term structure of the loan losses given the loan quality
rating system used and the actual loss given default are given in Section 3. The reasons for a Stress Test are shown in
Section 4. The stress test methodology is developed in Section 5. We concluded in Section 6.2. Loan quality rating system
Limited data availability restrict many researches on the credit risk analysis for community banks. We are grateful
for a community bank to provide the data sources for this analysis, where the community bank holds less than $1
billion in assets (until the time of the writing of this paper) and is located in a midwestern state of the United States and
has traditional product mix that includes various loans, transaction services and insured deposits.
A FDIC (2012)6 study examined the overall lending trend in the banking industry and documented how community
banks have shifted their focus away from retail and toward commercial leaning with a particular emphasis on loans
secured by commercial real estate. Prudent management and administration of the overall loan account, including
establishment of sound lending and collection policies, are of vital importance if the bank is to be continuously
operated in an acceptable manner (see FDIC Risk management Manual of Examination Policies Section 3.2 Loansg).
An important, if not the most important, purpose of a loan quality rating system is to provide the analytical
framework to support the establishment of and to determine the required amount in the allowance for loan and lease
losses. According to the Interagency Policy Statement on the Allowance of Loan and Lease Losses (ALLL), every
federally insured deposit or institution must maintain an ALLL at a level that is adequate to absorb estimated credit
losses associated with the loan and lease portfolio. This responsibility is charged to the Board of Directors of the bank.
An effective loan review system should work to ensure the accuracy of internal credit rating systems and, therefore, the
quality of the information used to assess the adequacy of the ALLL. In addition, loan quality rating systems allow
credit risk in individual credits to be differentiated and this allows management to monitor changes in risk levels.
In development of the loan quality rating system used by the bank, ratings for the regulatory credit classifications of
special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss were used. In addition, the regulatory credit classification of pass was
split into six different categories to allow for more granularities in this area. These extra differentiations of pass credits
allow for improved measurements of default and loss probabilities which allow for more accurate loan pricing. It also
allowed for better estimation of projected losses for ALLL purposes. The definitions of the loan quality ratings are
shown in the Appendix.
This bank also used a dual rating system for the loans reviewed. This dual rating system requires a rating on the
credit worthiness of the borrower and a rating based on the facility of the loan. This facility rating considers the loss
protection given by the collateral provided by the borrower of the loan. The two ratings are then combined using the
matrix shown in Appendix to develop an overall loan quality rating for the loan. In this paper, we use both the loan
grade, collateral code and purpose code as three rating components for the loan quality rating system. Hence, the loan
quality rating system provides an example of the coordinate rating proposed by the first author9; where the loan grade,
collateral code and purpose code are the first, second and third coordinate rating component respectively.f Berger, Cowan, & Frame14 address several deficiencies in the extant literature by employing data from a new survey of the use of credit scoring
in micro credit lending.
g Credit Grading Systems, Loan Review System Elements, Responsibility of the Board and Management, Factors to consider in estimating credit
losses are specified in FDIC Risk Management Manual.
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banks. Lending officer will assign risk ratings to each loan within their portfolios and update such ratings on an
ongoing basis as circumstance dictate. Credits of $100,000 or less will be assigned a risk rating using scoring
methodology. The creditworthiness of the borrower is determined objectively by completion of a loan quality
worksheet based on the various types of major lending categories. An example would be a loan to an agricultural
borrower. The applicable elements of the creditworthiness grade are shown in Appendix. In addition, a facility grade is
assigned to loan (Appendix from A Class to F Class). Both of these initial ratings (general creditworthiness of the
borrower and facility grade) are objective measures. In order to recognize that season lenders do have valuable insights
into the borrowers they are responsible for, changes can be made to the creditworthiness rating of the lending officer
has justifiable reasons why the rating should be adjusted up/down by one rating grade. If the overall loan quality rating
for the loan is not a “6” or lower, the loan will be rejected as it is presented. See Appendix Table 2.
It is important to understand the development of a loan quality ratings scale and how is used by the bank. From this
loan quality rating system and its use by the bank over several years, the data was collected which would allow the
ALLL to be developed, as well as to develop a way to perform a stress test on the loan portfolio.3. Term structure of the loan loss
In this section, we study the loan loss of the mid-size role community bank in the Midwest USA. We first analyze
the loan loss for each loan grade since 2007, as well as basic statistics of loan loss for each grade.
Since the financial crisis 2007e2008, the community bank has no loss for Grade 1 and Grade 2. This is probably
due to the rating procedure for community banks as we explain in the previous section. This is quite opposite with the
systemically important financial institutions.h More than 34,000 tranches rated by Moody's were downgraded (one-
third of downgraded ones bore the highest AAA rating), and the creditworthiness of structured finance securities
deteriorated sharply. More than 60% of all downgrades by December 2008 were tied to securities that had home equity
loans or first mortgages as collateral, and Citigroup, AIG and Merrill Lynch took write-downs totaling $34.1 billion,
$33.2 billion and $26.1 billion respectively due to collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). DeYoung et al (2004)4 show
that community banks and rural banks have invested more heavily in portfolio loans over time relative to larger banks
and analyze other differences over time.
Fig. 1 illustrates the loan loss analysis for the Grade 9 through the year 2007e2014. The data starts from 2007 as the
first year, and number 8 stands for the year 2014 (eight years after the grading system for the bank was implemented).
The overall mean loan loss for Grade 9 from 2007 to 2014 is 21.11%.
Fig. 2 illustrates the loan loss analysis for the Grade 8 through the year 2007e2014. Both Grade 8 and Grade 9 have
maximum loss in the year 2012. The overall mean loan loss for Grade 8 from 2007 to 2014 is 3.44%. There are big
discrepancy between Grade 8 and Grade 9 even though the loan grades are next to each other.
Fig. 3 illustrates the loan loss analysis for the Grade 7 through the year 2007e2014. Both Grade 7, Grade 6, Grade 5
and Grade 4 are consistent with the loss control from Figs. 3e6, and their overall mean loan losses are 0.51%, 0.09%,
0.01%, 0.05% respectively.
Fig. 4 illustrates the loan loss analysis for the Grade 6 through the year 2007e2014 with loss management in a
consistent way. Both Grade 5, Grade 4 and Grade 3 had losses concentrated over 2008e2010, 2009e2011,
2010e2012 respectively (see also Figs. 5e7). But the overall mean loan loss for Grade 3 is 0.31% which is actually
larger than the overall mean loan losses for Grade 4, Grade 5 and Grade 6.
Fig. 8 illustrate the loan loss analysis for the collateral code 1e4 Family Res $ <80% 2007e1014. The data starts
from the 2007 as the first year, and starts to loss at year 2010. The mean of loan loss for this collateral code reaches its
maximum at 2013 with 46.39% based point.
Fig. 9 shows that the loan loss for the collateral code 1e4 family Res $ >80% 2007e2014. The second year 2008
shows that the maximum mean for this code reaches 22 base points. Similarly for Figs. 10e16, various other types of
collateral codes's loan loss analysis are presented.h A systemically important financial institution (SIFI) is a bank, insurance company, or other financial institution whose failure might trigger a
financial crisis. In November 2011, the Financial Stability Board published a list of global systemically important financial institutions (G-SIFIs).
The Basel Committee has identified factors for assessing whether a financial institution is systemically important: its size, its complexity, its
interconnectedness, the lack of readily available substitutes for the financial infrastructure it provides, and its global (cross-jurisdictional) activity.
Fig. 1. New loan grade 9 loan loss analysis.
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for all grades are consistent, except a special credit event for Grade 3 in 2010 and 2011.
3.1. The loss rate given default
In the real world credit risk analysis, payoffs of defaulted securities are usually greater than zero. The recovery rate
given default is the value that an obligation can be recovered once the obligor has defaulted. Theoretically, this re-
covery rate given default measures the expected fractional recovery in case of default and as such takes any value in
the interval [0,1]. The loss rate given default (LGD) is the expected loss rate for the defaulted security in case of
default, and the loss rate given default is given by 1 minus the recovery rate given default. There are many different
ways to evaluate the LGD in theory and practice. For example, the recovery rate given default can be measured by
either the percentage of the par, or the percentage of the market value just prior to default or the percentage of a
default-free but otherwise equivalent bond, or the percentage of the initial value of the bond.Fig. 2. New loan grade 8 loan loss analysis.
Fig. 3. New loan grade 7 loan loss analysis.
Fig. 4. New loan grade 6 loan loss analysis.
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Fig. 5. New loan grade 5 loan loss analysis.
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reduced to the distribution of default probability as intensity rate) for equivalent defaultable bonds, where bonds with
the same maturity, quality and face value are equivalent. There is compensation in terms of equivalent defaultable
bonds, the recovery rate given default (or the loss rate given default) is expressed as a fraction of the market value of
the defaulted bond just prior to default. Moody's model for predicting recovery rate given default is the defaulted
instrument LossCalc, where the LossCalc methodology is a more dynamic approach developed using a database of
over 1800 instruments and multi-factors from industry specific, macro economic/business cycle specific and firm
specific. Gumption and Stein (2002) show that the model preforms better than common alternative models such as
overall historical averages or tables of averages of recovery rates.
Based on the data we have for this case study, none of the known methods used by credit rating agencies to evaluate
the loss rate given default can be applied, since the variables for the methodologies adapted in credit rating agencies
are different from the data we obtained for the community bank. Both S& P, Moody's and Fitch estimate the average
recovery rate given default for a special class of debt or for a given rating bonds. We present the actual loan loss with
collateral code and purpose code.
Table 4 shows the cumulative default data with actual losses. We also evaluate the potential losses given a yearly
cumulative default rate in the second part of Table 4.Fig. 6. New loan grade 4 loan loss analysis.
Fig. 7. New loan grade 3 loan loss analysis.
Fig. 8. Collateral code 1e4 family res <80% loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
Fig. 9. Collateral code 1e4 family res >80% loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
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Fig. 10. Collateral code commercial property loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
Fig. 11. Collateral code equip-commercial loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
Fig. 12. Collateral code rolling equip-commercial loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
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Fig. 13. Collateral code unsecured loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
Fig. 14. Collateral code new auto loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
Fig. 15. Collateral code used autos <5 years loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
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Fig. 16. Collateral code used autos >5 years loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
Table 3
Loan loss analysis 2007e2014.
Years Grade 9 Grade 8 Grade 7 Grade 6 Grade 5 Grade 4 Grade 3
1 0.00 1.78 1.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 31.65 1.59 0.83 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 21.10 3.20 0.55 0.13 0.02 0.00 0.00
4 19.26 2.40 0.42 0.12 0.02 0.00 0.70
5 15.41 1.92 0.33 0.10 0.01 0.12 0.56
6 29.51 4.75 0.28 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.47
7 25.29 6.19 0.24 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.40
8 34.63 5.70 0.21 0.06 0.01 0.08 0.35
Average 21.11 3.44 0.51 0.09 0.01 0.05 0.31
Source: a mid-size role community bank in the midwest USA. The loan loss with the mean in the table is given by percentage.
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collateral of the loan.We illustrate the loan loss from 2007 to 2011 based on commercial loans given by collateral code
in Table 5. Table 5 indicates for a particular collateral code loan the actual loss rate given default. This is different from
the LGD from the expectation of the loss given default by average all the previous loss given default (loss rate equals
to the ratio of the loss $ dollars over the average loan balance for a year in that category). Table 6 illustrates from
another point of view for the purpose code of the commercial loans from 2007 to 2014. Purpose code loans areTable 4
Cumulative Default Date with actual losses 2007e2011.
Year charged off Loan 2007 2008 2009 2010
$188,726 $775,603 $8000 $0
2007 $14,280
2008 $29,433 $7.704 $5325
2009 $115,679 $3353 $7327
2010 $989,415 $181,022 $766,924 $673
2011 $146,933
Loan Default rate 2007 2008 2009 2010
$1,754,576 0.25% $120,506 $127,933 $99.452 $109,206
$2,456,406 0.35% $168,709 $179,106 $139,233 $152,888
$2,807,321 0.40% $192,811 $204,693 $159,124 $174,730
$3,158,236 0.45% $216,912 $230,280 $179,014 $196,571
$3,509,152 0.50% $241,013 $255,866 $198,905 $218,412
Source: a mid-size role community bank in a midwestern state of USA. The actual loan loss is the potential expected the loss fraction given default.
Potential Losses given a yearly cumulative default rate. The average default rate is reported in the second column based on the data. The potential
losses predicted are $133,040, $141,239, $109,796, $120,564, respectively for 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010.
Table 5
Loan loss history based on commercial loans by collateral code 2007e2014.
Type of collateral 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
1e4 Family res <80% 0.00% 0.03% 0.00% 0.025% 1.987% 0.000% 1.205% 0.000%
1e4 Family res >80% 0.00% 0.44% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Multifamily res 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Construction 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Farmland 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Commercial property 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 5.92% 0.000% 4.020% 1.340% 0.260%
Crops 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Livestock 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Equipment e AG 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Cow/calf 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Inventory/acc rec 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Equip e commercial 0.00% 0.00% 7.93% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Rolling equip e comm 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Lockbox 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Auto floorplan 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Motorcycle floor 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Unsecured 0.45% 0.44% 0.60% 0.00% 0.128% 0.250% 0.009% 0.197%
Auto 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Savings & C.D. 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Stocks e bonds 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Assignments e R/E 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Assignments e other 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Airplane 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
New' auto 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.40% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Used auto <5 years 0.00% 0.98% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Used auto >5 years 1.74% 2.31% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.706% 0.889%
Miscellaneous 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Mobile homes 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Travel Trailers/motor homes 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Marine equipment 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Household goods 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
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different loan losses varying from one code to another. These are related to the coordinate rating proposed by the first
author.9 Here the coordinate rating is given by the loan grade, collateral code and purpose code as the first, second and
third coordinate rating component in this case study. Individual loan may be classified from the purpose code and from
the collateral code as well as the loan grading, and those different perspectives formulate the coordinate rating. Here,
every commercial loan has the credit rating given in the Appendix, the corresponding collateral code and the purpose
code.
4. Lessons for stress test assessments
In this section, we discuss why ALLL is not adequate to act as a stress test device. The agencies believe an
assessment of the appropriateness of the ALLL is critical to the safety and soundness of a financial institution.
Consistent with longstanding supervisory guidance, financial institutions must maintain an ALLL at a level that is
appropriate to cover estimated credit losses on individually evaluated loans determined to be impaired as well as
estimated credit losses inherent in the remainder of the loan and lease portfolio.
While the allowance for loan and lease losses account has been thought of as protection of all losses inherent in a
loan portfolio, examination of the definition of the ALLL account shows this may not be the case. The primary
components of the ALLL consist of loans collectively evaluated for impairment (the FAS 5 component 1), loans
individually evaluated for impairment (the FAS 114 component 2), and loans acquired with deteriorated credit quality
(the SOP 03-3 component 3). See GrantThornton (2012)7 for more adjustment factors and needed components of FAS
5 loan loss allowance estimation methodology.
Table 6
Loan loss history based on loans by purpose code 2007e2014.
Purpose 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Coml construction 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 31.420% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
1e4 family res constr 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Multi-family consTR 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Permanent 1e4 family 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Permanent multi-family 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Farmland 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Commercial property 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 2.910% 0.000% 4.810% 2.000% 0.420%
Purchase 1e4 family (owner) 0.000% 0.950% 0.000% 0.036% 3.039% 0.025% 1.651% 0.000%
2nd MTG/home improvement 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Stocker cattle/hedge 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Cow/calf 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Cotton crop 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Wheat crop 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Other crops 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Farm equipment 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Farm oper expense 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Other livestock 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Working capital 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.020% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Buy business 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Floor vehicles 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Capital injection 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Buy CML equipment 0.000% 0.000% 7.020% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
CML repairs 0.000% 1.250% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.010% 0.000%
Investment 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Personal expense 1.070% 1.270% 1.490% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.360%
Judgement 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 103.110% 0.000% 0.000%
New autos 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.240% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
AG restruct debt 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Other restruct debt 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Used automobiles 0.830% 0.820% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.380% 0.380%
Mobile home 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Marine equipment 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Travel trailer/motor home 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Household goods 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Total 0.020% 0.035% 0.339% 1.106% 0.231% 0.585% 0.229% 0.041%
Loans by Purpose Code with specific years from 2007 to 2014. There are some overlap codes between the collateral code and purpose code.
23W. Li, P. McMahan / The Journal of Finance and Data Science 1 (2015) 11e32In the OCC Handbook “Allowance for Loan and Lease Losses”, the following statements are made:
 The allowance must be maintained at a level that is adequate to absorb all estimated “inherent losses” in the loan
and lease portfolio.
 Inherent loss is the amount of loss that meets the conditions of Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
(FAS) 5 for accrual of a loss contingency. FAS 5 defines a “loss contingency” as an existing condition, situations,
or set of circumstances involving uncertainty as to possible losses that will ultimately be resolved when one or
more future events occur. A provision to the ALLL for a loss contingency associated with loans should be made
only if both of the FAS 5 conditions are met:
Information available as of evaluation date indicates that it is probable that the value of the loan has been impaired;
and, the amount of laws can be reasonably estimated.
 An inherent loss, therefore, is an unconfirmed loss that probably exists based on information available when the
evaluation is made. The amount of loss must be subject to reasonable estimation.
24 W. Li, P. McMahan / The Journal of Finance and Data Science 1 (2015) 11e32 For pools of loans, coverage of one year's loss is often adequate. OCC examiners should generally view this level
of coverage as appropriate. The allowance must cover the bank's best estimate of the inherent losses in the entire
portfolio as of the valuation date.
 The allowance is a valuation reserve maintained to cover losses that are probable and estimable on the date of the
valuation. The allowance is not a cushion against possible future losses; that protection is provided by capital.
The Handbook also discusses adjustments of the ALLL for changes in the national and local economic business
conditions which would require an adjustment to historical loss rates.
The above statements indicate that the ALLL is designed to absorb expected and probable losses that would
occur over the next year, not accounting for FASB 114 losses existing in the allowance. Even taking into account
qualitative adjustments that could be made to the historical loss rates by management, the ALLL does not and is not
designed to handle unexpected losses based on unlikely events. However, as we have seen, unexpected losses based
on unexpected events do occur. Prudent risk management would dictate that bank management and the Board of
Directors identify and quantify the amount of loss that bank capital could support if the unexpected did occur. By
using the data kept by the bank and simple statistical models, based on that data, loss scenarios could be derived to
“stress” bank capital. The management and the board would have the information required to work to mitigate the
loss scenarios.
5. Stress test methodology
In 2012, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency11 issued a bulletin regarding “Community Bank Stress
Testing: Supervisory Guidance”. This bulletin did not provide a specific methodology to perform the stress test. The
stress test model should fit the bank's unique loan portfolio. The bulletin did suggest that the appropriate time frame for
a stress test scenario should be at least a two year projection. The authors of the paper do not use a specific time period
that the losses could occur. We are only attempting to measure those that may occur in poor economic conditions.
We use the “reverse stress test method” in which the bank assumes a specific adverse outcome but does not know
the circumstances which might lead to the outcome in this paper. This makes sense in the fact that unexpected and
unplanned situations are what we are attempting to determine the adequacy of the bank's capital. Most community
banks do not have the capability to relate local economic factors such as local unemployment rates, housing starts,
local unemployment or other variables that might be put in a model that could explain, using regression or other
statistical means, increase in loan losses as economic conditions weaken. Also, we do not use the loan quality rating
system to determine possible losses. In unexpected loss scenarios, we must expect loss correlations between loan types
to become 100%, regardless of how these correlations have been measured in the past. The guidance suggests and this
paper demonstrates that a breakdown of the loan portfolio on both a “purpose code” (the reason the funds were
extended) and a “collateral code” (the collateral securing the loan) should be used. In addition, the stress testing
requirements for large bank discuss that three different scenarios should be tested; these are a baseline scenario, an
adverse scenario, and a severely adverse scenario. We will use a similar analysis in this paper in that the baseline
scenario will represent the mean loss rate, the adverse scenarios will represent two measurements, the maximum loss
rate during the time the data covers (2007e2014) and the mean loss rate plus two standard deviations (which should
cover 95.45% of the loss), with the severely adverse scenario based on two measurements, one being two times the
maximum loss rate, and the other being mean lost rate plus 3.29 standard deviations (which should cover 99.9% of the
losses). In this analysis, we assume that the loan loss distributions for each category are normally distributed. We could
expand the number of standard deviations in order to use Chebychev's theorem that, for example, five standard de-
viations from the mean would include 96% of the losses, regardless of the distribution of the losses. Also in this
analysis we use the sample standard deviation of the losses in the individual categories.
As shown in the analysis, there are types of loans, both using purpose codes and collateral codes, which had no loss
history in the time frame studied. This does not mean that there are no losses on these types of loans in the history of
the bank, only that none occurred in this time period (2007e2014). This is a significant issue in developing a robust
stress test using historical data. Determination of the time horizon required to obtain sufficient loan loss history to
account for losses in each category could dilute losses which have occurred recently which can be more relative to the
determination of future losses. As seen in this paper, eight years may be inadequate to develop a stress test that has
individual loss rates in each category.
Table 7
Purpose code loan loss analysis.
























þ 3.29 Std dev
(99.9%)
Purpose
Coml construction $1,267,751.05 3.93% 31.42% 26.14% 62.84% 40.47% $49,790.92 $398,327.38 $331,450.91 $796,654.76 $513,121.61
1e4 family res constr $5,854,726.77 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Multi-family constr $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Permanent 1e4 family $3,726,139.31 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Permant multi-family $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Farmland $35,452,320.36 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Commercial property $11,575,504.18 1.27% 4.81% 4.89% 9.62% 7.22% $146,719.52 $556,781.75 S565,711.20 $1,113,563.50 $835,960.83
Purchase 1e4 family (owner) $4,803,251.89 0.71% 3.04% 2.96% 6.08% 4.40% $34,229.17 $145,970.82 S141,958.36 $291,941.65 $211,443.68
2nd mtu'home improvement $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Stocker cattle' hedge $1,322,947.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Cow/calf $2,877,862.66 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Cotton crop $2,081,815.97 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Wheat crop $935,933.51 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Other crops $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Farm equipment $1,868,375.26 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Farm oper expense $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Other livestock $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Working capital $2,940,223.93 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.04% 0.03% $73.51 $588.04 S489.32 $1176.09 $757.51
Buy business $4,452,779.32 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Floor vehicles $1,528,417.50 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Capital injection $1,933,842.28 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Buy CML equipment $3,405,729.60 0.88% 7.02% 5.84% 14.04% 9.04% $29,885.28 $239,082.22 S198,941.93 $478,164.44 $307,983.48
CML repairs $1,527,285.14 0.16% 1.25% 1.04% 2.50% 1.61% $2405.47 $19,091.06 S15,889.89 $38,182.13 $24,587.34
Investment $41,597,094.49 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Personal expense $1,362,520.42 0.52% 1.49% 1.81% 2.98% 2.65% $7136.20 $20,301.55 S24,715.17 $40,603.11 $36,053.60
Judgement $0.00 12.50% 100.00% 83.21% 100.00% 100.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
New altos $118,139.71 0.03% 0.24% 0.20% 0.48% 0.31% $35.44 $283.54 S235.93 $567.07 $365.25
AG restrict debt $74,813.14 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Other restruct debt $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Used automobiles $289,320.41 0.30% 0.83% 1.03% 1.66% 1.50% $871.58 $2401.36 S2,973.98 $4802.72 $4330.04
Mobile home $53,852.54 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Marine equipment $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Travel trailer/motor home $25,507.81 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Household goods $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Total $131,076,154.25 $271,147.09 $1,382,827.73 S1,282,366.69 $2,765,655.46 $1,934,603.33
0.21% 1.05% 0.98% 2.11% 1.48%
Loans not being reserved for $103,786,427.92 Additional reserve tor loans mi explicitly reserved for $214,694.95 $1,094,926.47 S1,015,381.16 $2,189,852.94 $1,531,823.77
Total loss $ $485,842.03 S2,477,754.20 S2,297,747.85 $4,955,508.40 S3,466,427.10



















































Collateral code loan loss analysis.

























þ 3.29 Std dev
(99.9%)
Collateral
1e4 family res <80% $6,004,244.77 0.41% 1.99% 1.93% 3.97% 2.92% $24,369.73 $119,304.34 S116,091.80 $238,608.69 $175,252.54
1e4 family res >80% $1,761,663.39 0.06% 0.44% 0.37% 0.88% 0.57% $968.91 $7751.32 S6,449.93 $15,502.64 $9985.18
Multi family res S0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Construction $7,637,306.51 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Farmland $36,935,118.14 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Commercial property $19,189,724.58 1.44% 5.92% 6.00% 11.84% 8.95% $276,811.78 $1136.031.70 $1,152,280.94 $2,272,063.39 $1,716,958.55
Crops $3,997,621.19 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Livestock S75 1.634.06 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Equipment-AG $2,835,544.94 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Cow/calf S0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Inventory/ACC Rec $40,006,093.85 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Equip e commercial $1,543,878.95 0.99% 7.93% 6.60% 15.86% 10.22% $15,303.70 $122,429.60 S101,874.50 $244,859.20 $157,712.67
Rolling equip e comm $1,146,929.87 0.01% 0.09% 0.07% 0.18% 0.12% $129.03 $1032.24 $858.93 $2064.47 $1329.72
Lockbox $290,150.35 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Auto floorplan $1,528,417.50 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Motorcycle floor S0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Unsecured $1,409,865.10 0.26% 0.60% 0.70% 1.20% 0.98% $3655.08 $8459.19 S9,834.54 $16,918.38 $13,820.29
Auto S0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Savings & CD $2,847,470.64 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Stocks e bonds $1,821,736.83 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Assignments e RE S0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Assignments e other $238,603.04 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Airplane $38,682.21 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
New auto $76,545.56 0.05% 0.40% 0.33% 0.80% 0.52% $38.27 $306.18 $254.78 $612.36 S394.42
Used auto <5 years $222,159.39 0.12% 0.98% 0.82% 1.96% 1.26% $272.15 $2177.16 $1811.63 $4354.32 $2804.60
Used auto >5 years $192,758.23 0.71% 2.31% 2.51% 4.62% 3.67% $1360.15 $4452.72 S4,829.55 $8905.43 $7067.32
Miscellaneous $465,697.51 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Mobile homes $108,799.83 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Travel trailers/motor homes $25,507.81 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Marine equipment S0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
Household goods S0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% $0.00 S0.00 $0.00 $0.00 S0.00
$131,076,154.25 S322,908.79 $1,401,944.45 $1,394,286.60 S2,803,888.89 $2,085,325.29
0.25% 1.07% 1.06% 2.14% 1.59%
Loans not being reserved for $99,528,384.41 Additional reserve for loans not explicitly reserved for S245,190.22 $1,064,520.59 $1,058,705.86 S2,129,041.19 $1,583,423.45
Total loss S S568,099.01 $2,466,465.04 $2,452,992.46 S4,932,930.08 $3,668,748.74
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measured to determine the loss rate to be used for the loan categories which have not had loan losses and the time
period studied. In this way, where using the loan losses which had been incurred by the bank to project losses on loan
categories which have not had losses. Table 7 illustrates the loan losses derived in the various scenarios and methods of
analysis using purpose codes. Table 8 shows the same illustration for collateral codes. These loan loss amounts shown
do not include any FASB 114 adjustments which would need to be added to the analysis as FASB 114 loans have
explicit loss reserves allocated to them.
Using the two different breakdowns of the loans, we can see that the loss percentages turn out to be very close. For
example, using two times the maximum yearly loss rate, the purpose code analysis indicates a loss of $4,955,508
(3.78%) while the collateral code analysis indicates a loss of $4,932,930 (3.76%). We would expect the loss amounts
to be close but this does serve as a good cross check in examining loss scenarios. The baseline scenarios, using the
mean losses, may be similar to the amount in a bank's ALLL. As shown in the stress test analysis, this is substantially
less than what may be required in an economic downturn. This difference in the baseline and severally adverse
scenarios may cause the management to consider alternative lending strategies. Also, by breaking the losses out by
various categories, it can alert management where the category where the largest risk of loss may be so management
can take proactive steps to mitigate future risks.
It could be asked if, instead of using collateral codes or purpose codes, one could use the loan quality rating system
grades as the only part of the stress testing analysis. Both Tables 9 and 10 indicate the use of the data based on the loan
quality rating system loss rates as input into a stress test. Table 9 illustrates the historical losses by loan quality grade
over the past 8 years (2007e2014), and shows the mean, sample standard deviation, median, and maximum loan loss
percentages for each grade in terms of the loan quality rating.
Table 10 uses this data and the year end 2014 balances by loan quality rating grade to develop an analysis in the
same format as those presented using the collateral and purpose codes in Tables 5 and 6.When comparing the loan loss
amounts based on the various scenarios tested using loan quality ratings to the losses calculated using the collateral
codes explicitly reserved for, the loan loss amounts are with $344,000 (less than 0.25%). However, in both the
collateral code and purpose code loan loss analyses, we must account for loan categories that have not generated any
loan losses in the past 8 years (the time period of the study). This was done by applying the overall loan loss percentage
generated on the loan categories explicitly reserved for to the loan amounts not specifically reserved for. Unless one
looks at the loan losses generated by the specific categories of loans, using only the loan quality rating system could
result in a substantial amount of potential losses to be unaccounted for. This would have to be accounted for if one used
only a loan quality rating system through the use of a transition matrix which would indicate the amount of loans
moving from a high loan quality rating grade to a lower loan quality rating grade in the time of financial crisis and
resulting loan stress. As shown in Table 10, the amount of loans required to migrate from grade 4 to grade 8 would be
approximately $6,700,000 or 14% of the current grade 4 loans. If the data has not covered a period of time where
financial stress has occurred, a transition matrix would not indicate such a shift.
This analysis seems to indicate that one must triangulate a stress test to obtain results that cover the risks in the loan
portfolio by using all 3 coordinate ratings as proposed by the first author.9Table 9
Loan losses by loan quality rating 2007e2014.
Loan quality ratings 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Mean Sample std dev Median Max
Grade 1 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Grade 2 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Grade 3 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 2.810% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.351% 0.993% 0.000% 2.810%
Grade 4 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.620% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.078% 0.219% 0.000% 0.620%
Grade 5 0.000% 0.000% 0.067% 0.003% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.009% 0.024% 0.000% 0.067%
Grade 6 0.000% 0.280% 0.098% 0.100% 0.000% 0.000% 0.020% 0.000% 0.062% 0.098% 0.010% 0.280%
Grade 7 1.220% 0.440% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.020% 0.210% 0.436% 0.000% 1.220%
Grade 8 1.780% 1.400% 6.410% 0.000% 0.000% 18.910% 14.800% 2.270% 5.696% 7.255% 2.025% 18.910%
Grade 9 0.000% 63.300% 0.000% 13.740% 0.000% 100.000% 0.000% 100.000% 34.630% 45.672% 6.870% 100.000%
Grade 10 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Table 10




























þ 3.29 Std dev
(99.9%)
1 $2,231,548.30 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
2 $1,383,176.97 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
3 $16,065,626.82 0.351% 2.810% 2.338% 5.620% 3.620% $56,430.51 $451,444.11 $375,649.71 $902,888.23 $581,546.09
4 $48,454,142.51 0.078% 0.620% 0.516% 1.240% 0.799% $37,551.96 $300,415.68 $249,977.93 $600,831.37 $386,992.68
5 $53,433,646.25 0.009% 0.067% 0.056% 0.134% 0.086% $4675.44 $35,800.54 $29,853.33 $71,601.09 $46,093.06
6 $7,144,172.21 0.062% 0.280% 0.259% 0.560% 0.385% $4447.25 $20,003.68 $18,468.09 $40,007.36 $27,511.53
7 $140,520.75 0.210% 1.220% 1.082% 2.440% 1.644% $295.09 $1714.35 $1519.94 $3428.71 $2309.97
8 $2,223,320.44 5.696% 18.910% 20.206% 37.820% 29.564% $126,645.89 $420,429.90 $449,238.40 $840,859.79 $657,310.56
9 $0.00 34.630% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% 100.000% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
10 $0.00 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
Total $131,076,154.25 $230,046.15 $1,229,808.27 $1,124,707.39 $2,459,616.54 $1,701,763.89
0.176% 0.938% 0.858% 1.876% 1.298%
$ Losses based on collateral codes explicitly reserved for $322,908.79 $1,401,944.45 $1,394,286.60 $2,803,888.89 $2,085,325.29
0.246% 1.070% 1.064% 2.139% 1.591%
$ Losses based on collateral code in tool $568,099.01 $2,466,465.04 $2,452,992.46 $4,932,93 0.08 $3,668,748.74
$ Needed in losses $338,052.86 $1,236,656.77 $1,328,285.07 $2,473,313.54 $1,966,984.85
$ Grade 4 to 8 $6,016,513.64 $6,761,382.01 $6,746,044.34 $6,761,382.01 $6,837,955.52
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While community banks are relatively small in size compared with those systemically important financial in-
stitutions (SIFI), the survival pressure in this competitive world is large. On the other hand, there is no regulatory
guidance for the credit risk measure and stress test, as the Dodd-Frank Act forces SIFIs for semi-annual or annual
stress test to understand the potential default risk.
We analyze a case study on a community bank from the term structure of the bank's historical losses and the
statistical valuations of loan loss reserves for both purpose code and loan grade. The findings of this paper are (1)
first to show how a community bank can use a loan quality rating system to categorize the loans, (2) to develop a
robust methodology to calculate loan loss reserves for the bank, (3) to initiate the stress test device for community
banks from our statistical valuations, (4) to show the actual loan loss and cumulative default rate and (5) to illustrate
a dual credit rating system as a practical example of coordinate credit ratings. A sample of loan quality rating
definitions are given, and a procedure for assigning the grade is illustrated to specify the credit rating of community
banks.
There are some survey researches in community banks, but no credit risk analysis has been done in the literature,
based on the authors' knowledge from searching the informations. After 2007e2009 financial crisis, the risk man-
agement of community banks are demanded to be improved like SIFIs mandated the stress test annually. We are going
to show more systemic understanding of the credit risk for community banks in Li and McMahan (2015)10 based on
more data sets.Appendix
There are 10 rating categories for borrowers since 2007 for community banks in USA. Here is a working flow chart
to assign a loan quality rating to a loan at a community bank.
Preliminary borrower rating: Determine the most appropriate rating for the borrow by using the narrative de-
scriptions from Grade 1 to Grade 10.
Redefine borrower rating: Redefine the borrower rating by using a “best fit” appropriate borrower rating matrix.
Finalize borrower rating: Finalize the borrower rating by making judgmental adjustments.
Base facility rating: Determine the base facility rating by using the facility rating matrix and adjustments.
Document borrower and facility ratings: Document the logic “best fit” of objective factors and judgmental
adjustments to finalize the borrower rating and the base facility rating.
Composite rating matrix: Integrate both the borrower rating and the base facility rating to determine a single
credit risk rating by using the composite risk rating matrix.
Preliminary Borrower Ratings from grade 1 to 10 are given briefly byi
 Grade 1 Minimal risk: The borrower demonstrates exceptional credit fundamentals, including stable and
predictable, profit margins, cash flows, strong liquidity and a conservative balance sheet;
 Grade 2 Modest risk: The borrower consistently generates very good cash flow internally to fund debt service,
working capital and some capital expenditures. The borrowers have reasonably strong liquidity with profitability
and key balance sheet ratios consistently better than industry norms.
 Grade 3 Average risk: The borrower generates more than sufficient cash flow to fund debt service, some
working capital and/or capital expansion. Profitability and key balance sheet ratios are well within industry
average norms.
 Grade 4 Acceptable: The borrower generates sufficient cash flow to fund debt service in most years. Profit-
ability and key balance sheet ratios (liquidity and leverage ratios) usually average/close to peers. But working
capital and all capital expansion needs are provided from external sources.
 Grade 5 Marginally acceptable: The borrower exhibits excessive growth, declining earning or losses, strained
cash flow, increasing leverage with limited additional debt capacity, minimal debt service coverage, and average
or below average core operating fundamentals.i Different community banks may assign borrowers rating from different narrative descriptions.
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agement concern with weak cash flow, adequate collateral coverage and cash reserves to cover near-term debt
service (not adequate for long-term debt service).
New loans which are graded below a “6” will not be made.
 Grade 7 Special mention: The borrower demonstrates negative trends in the balance sheet and income state-
ment, cash flow may be insufficient to meet debt service. Profitability and key balance sheet ratio below peers,
and potential risk of payment default.
 Grade 8 Substandard: The borrower demonstrates poor asset quality, a weak capital base which is insufficient
to absorb continuing losses, poor liquidity and key balance sheet ratios substantially inferior the industry norms,
but adequate collateral coverage should cover outstanding principal and interest.
 Grade 9 Doubtful: The borrower holds doubtful assets, has insufficient cash flow to service debt, a series of
substantial losses, is highly illiquid with excessive leverage, and key balance sheet rations at unacceptable levels.
 Grade 10 Loss: The borrower cannot generate sufficient cash flow to cover fixed charges, have negative cash
flow and earnings for all near-term and long-term trends, no support from collateral and guarantees. Loan is
uncollectible and of little value.
Examples on some grades are: Grade 6 for a builder who is involved with moving slow projects or has a mixed
record of meeting construction standards or timetables for sales/rental achievements on previous development; Grade
4 for a company with minor financial problems such as debt is paying as agreed and there are no known weaknesses
that would warrant a lowering rating; Grade 3 for a medium-sized company with consistent profits and more than
adequate cash flow and strong balance sheet with positive trends and good management; Grade 2 for a regional
company with a strong balance sheet and consistently strong earnings performance; and Grade 1 for a company that
borrow primarily for short-term liquidity or working capital needs and requiring minimal term debt.
Based on the loan quality, we assign a preliminary debt or rating from Grade 1 to Grade 10. In this community
banks, the lending officers first use more objective evaluation criteria which will different depending on typical loan
and business. This is a special part of the community banks in evaluating the ratings which may be different from the
credit rating assigned for debts in large banks. Those credit rating agencies look for different financial characteristics
and macroeconomic factors to measure the probability of default and recovery rate in order to assign a credit rating,
among other things.
After the preliminary borrower rating process, the risk rating descriptions are important to further access the
borrower best-fit rating grade. We present the borrower rating matrix for commercial and industrial debtors in Table 1.Table 1
Commercial and Industrial borrower rating matrix
RRD G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6
Debt/TNW <0.50 [0.51,1.25] [1.26,2.25] [2.26,3.00] [3.01,3.75] 3.76
EBIDA/PI 2.00 [1.75,2.00] [1.5,1.74] [1.25,1.49] [1.00,1.24] 1.00
OPB PL 10 PL 7 PL 5 PL 3 PL 1 BU
Current Ratio 1.75 [[1.5,1.74] [1.25,1.49] [1.00,1.24] [0.75,0.99] 0.75
RH Ahead schedule Original terms Usually by terms Restructured Slow Collection Problem
QFI Audited/Unqualified Audited/Qualified Reviewed Compiles or TR BPF or TR  previous Column
CVC 10 15 20 25 35 >35
Industry Risk 1.00e2.99 3.00e4.99 5.00e6.99 7.00e8.99 9.00e10.99 >11.00
FT Very positive Positive Stable Erratic Negative Very negative
FICO Score 760 730e759 700e729 670e699 640e669 639
Source: a mid-size role community bank in the midwest USA. (i) Include property subordinated debt in the calculation of tangible net worth and
deduct the subordinated debt from the total debt; (ii) liquid assets include cash, cash equivalents and marketable securities. Retirement accounts,
education accounts or securities otherwise pledged are excluded; (iii) Industry risk will evaluate relative to the probability of default statistics
published by the Risk Management Association. Brief RRD stands for Risk rating description, TNW for tangible net worth, PI for the sum of
principal and interest, OPB for operating profit before extraordinary items and taxes, PL n for the profitable the last n years, BU for the break-even or
unprofitable in most recent year, RH for repayment history of all, QFI for quality of financial information, TR for Tax returns, BPF for the borrower
prepared financials, CVC for the customer and/or Vendor concentration (% of sales), FT for financial trends, FICO Score for FICO.
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for each category of the commercial and industrial loans, commercial real estate and multifamily loans, real estate
construction and development loans and agriculture loans.
The final component of finalizing the borrower rating allows the loan officer to make various judgement adjust-
ments to the borrower ratings under the following circumstances:
 When financial statements do not provide an accurate picture of the borrower's true structure or performance;
 When there is a substantial discrepancy between the current quality of management and the company's financial
performance and/or condition;
 When the borrower has violated a loan covenant or is requiring covenant relief, is party to litigation or is filing
for bankruptcy;
The above are examples of when a judgmental adjustment may be used.
Base facility rating is issued for six collateral classes in practices. Utilizing the facility matrix across multiple lines
of business, one can assign a rating to the facility. We list the criteria for six collateral classes with brief descriptions.
AClass (Excellent):Collateral consists of: Cash held at the bank, letters of credit or bond issuance from issuer with
AA or better investment grade, government securities at policy advance rates, credit 100% guaranteed by the full faith
and credit of the US government.
B Class (Superior): Collateral consists of: Cash held at other banks, letters of credit or bond issuance from issuer
with A or better investment grade or one-rated financial institution, cash equivalents such as cash value of whole life
insurance, marketable securities including federal agency, municipal and corporate securities margined at policy
advance rate, the portion of facilities guaranteed 80% or more by the US government or an agency, commercial,
agriculture or owner-occupied real estate with less than 50% LTV (loan to value).
C Class (Above Average): Collateral consists of: Senior/subordinated debt tranches vis-a^-vis other debt positions,
asset-based lending with dominion and control of collateral, commercial, agriculture or owner-occupied real estate
with 51e65% LTV, an abundance of other collateral (130% of policy advance rate) or exceptional collateral, operating
agricultureecrop lien with borrowing base/joint checks and reporting/covenants.
D Class (Average): Collateral consists of: Collateral meeting policy standards for quality and coverage, com-
mercial, agriculture or owner-occupied real estate with 66e75% LTV, controlled receivables and inventory at policy
advances rate, crop lien plus other collateral, fixed assets including equipment at advance rates against approved
appraised value, facilities guaranteed 70% by the US government or agency, second lien position combined with first
lien less than 50% LTV.
E Class (Below Average): Collateral consists of: Blanket lien or mixed collateral, LTV fails to meet policy
standards, uncontrolled accounts receivable and inventory, crop lien, unsecured guarantee, intellectual property,
second lien with combination first and second lien 60e80% LTV.
F Class (Weak): Collateral consists of: Unsecured, second lien position combined with first lien greater than 81%,
springing lien, negative pledge, assignment of partnership interest, comfort letters from controlling affiliated entities.
It is possible to make adjustments to the facility rating using judgmental factors, and those judgmental factors may
upgrade the facility rating or downgrade the facility rating. The facility rating of the unsecured guaranty is to be
determined by referring to the third party facility rating matrix.Table 2
Composite risk rating matrix
Borrower rating A class B class C Class D class E class F class
Grade 1 1 1 1 1 2 3
Grade 2 1 1 1 2 3 4
Grade 3 1 2 2 3 4 5
Grade 4 2 2 3 4 5 6
Grade 5 2 3 4 5 6 7
Grade 6 3 4 5 6 7 8
Source: a mid-size role community bank in the midwest USA. The criteria for the preliminary borrower ratings and the facility ratings may vary
among community banks, but the procedure is same.
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mental adjustments is done to determine the composite rating as the single loan quality risk rating from the borrower
grades. Table 2 illustrate an example from Grade 1 to Grade 6 with the facility ratings.
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